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Jr., on the other hand, thoroughly discussed the implications of re-
apportionment upon county governments and took a very different
stand on such side effects.30 He spoke of malapportionment as the most
crucial obstacle to the development of "urban counties" which in turn
might be a chosen instrument for "metropolitan salvation." 31 Speaking
before Avery, Dixon's following prediction optimistically cited the side
effects of a decision like Avery:
In short, by judicial fiat, and as a totally unexpected by-
product of the original state legislative reapportionment suit
from Tennessee in 1962, we may soon have on hand a ready-
made political instrument for 'metro' development, in the form
of reinvigorated county government, that probably could not have
developed in a generation of popular referenda. A county board
on which all sections of the county-city, suburban, rural-are
represented approximately in proportion to their population,
could be a ready-made 'metro' instrument. The traditional char-
acter of the county should ease the path to acceptability.3 2
Dixon also saw the more difficult challenge that local reapportion-
ment poses warning that "particularly in those states with a tradition
of township organization, [it] is a more complex, more challenging,
and potentially more revolutionary process than state legislative re-
apportionment. 3 3
There are also inherent problems. For example, what does the Court
mean by its conveniently vague "arbitrary and invidious" test? What
is "an allowable population disparity" ?34 It was a simple matter, almost
a constitutional reflex, to declare that districts of 67,906; 852; 414;
and 828 were grossly disproportionate, but it will be in the gray fact
situations that the idea of "the substantially equal vote" will provide
the Court with its most challenging realities. As is the case with so
many "breakthrough" decisions, only time and cautious but perceptive
decisions by the Supreme Court in this vast new area will allow a true
evaluation as to whether or not one man-one vote is applicable to local
governmental units. PATRIcK K. HETRICK
Federal Courts and Procedure: Abstention: Under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person
... (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any state law, ...
and exurbia, the problem of allocating local government functions and benefits
urgently requires attention, I am persuaded that it does not call for the
hatchet of one man, one vote."
0330 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 57 (1965).
31 Id. at 70.
32Id. at 73.
3 Id. at 74.34For example of the problems present when the Court deals with population
disparities see Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1963).
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of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the
United States .... " Thus, a litigant has the power to determine whether
a state or federal court will hear and decide his federal constitutional
claims. Simply because the state courts have the same obligation to
enforce the United States Constitution as do the federal courts, "It is
no answer that the state has a law which if enforced would give relief.
The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the
latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is
invoked."1
2
However, in those cases in which certain narrowly defined "special
circumstances" are present, the judicial doctrine of abstention sanctions
the right of a federal court to decline jurisdiction over federal con-
stitutional claims. In Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.,3 the Su-
preme Court set forth the judicial policy underlying the application of
the abstention doctrine when it said:
Few public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion
of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction
with state policies, whether the policy relates to the enforce-
ment of the criminal law .... or the administration of a special-
ized scheme for liquidating authority of a state court to inter-
pret doubtful regulatory laws of the state .... these cases reflect
a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system,
whereby the federal courts, exercising a wise discretion, restrain
their authority because of scrupulous regard for the rightful
independence of the state governments and for the smooth work-
ing of the federal judiciary.4
In Zwickler v. Koota,5 the Court held that absent any "special cir-
cumstances" which would permit a district court to abstain and remand
the plaintiff to the state courts, "a request for a declaratory judgment
that a state statute is overbroad on its face must be considered inde-
pendently of any request for injunctive relief against the enforcement
of that statute."6
Sanford Zwickler was convicted of violating section 781-b of the
New York Penal Law7 because he had distributed anonymous hand-
bills critical of the record of a United States Congressman seeking re-
election in the 1964 elections." Section 781-b makes it a crime for any
person to distribute in quantity any handbill concerning any candidate
without the name and address of the person distributing them appear-
ing thereon. In his appeal to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
128 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964).
2 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1960).
3312 U.S. 496 (1940).
4Id. at 500-1.
5 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
6d. at 254.7N.Y. PENAL LAW § 781-b (McKinney 1965).
s People v. Zwickler (Crim. Ct. N.Y. City, Kings Co., February 10, 1965).
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Term,9 Zwickler alleged that section 781-b was void because it abridged
his constitutional right of free expression. The court reversed his con-
viction on the ground that he had not distributed anonymous handbills
in quantity, but did not rule as to the constitutionality of section 781-b.
This decision was affirmed without opinion by the New York Court of
Appeals. 10 Zwickler then petitioned the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York" for both injunctive and declaratory relief, in-
voking its jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act 2 and the Declaratory
Judgment Act.13 The district court applied the doctrine of abstention
on two grounds. First, relying on Dombrowski v. Pfister,14 it held that
Zwickler had failed to demonstrate any conditions prerequisite to the
granting of injunctive relief, and that consequently, this failure pre-
cluded it from considering the prayer for a declaratory judgment.
Second, the court ruled that section 781-b was susceptible to an inter-
pretation by the state courts that would either avoid or modify the
constitutional issue, and therefore remanded Zwickler to the New York
courts to seek an appropriate remedy.
The issues raised on appeal in Zwickler were:
• . . first, whether abstention from the declaratory judgment
sought by the appellant would have been appropriate in the ab-
sence of his request for injunctive relief, and second, if not,
whether abstention was nevertheless justified because appellant
also sought an injunction against future criminal prosecutions
for violation of section 781-b.1
With regard to the first issue, the request for declaratory relief, in
his amended complaint Zwickler alleged that section 781-b was not
void for vagueness, but rather that its clearly overbroad sweep invaded
his first amendment right of free expression. The appellee concurred
with this contention, admitting that there was no way the state courts
could possibly narrow section 781-b through a limiting construction
so as to avoid a decision of the appellant's constitutional claim. In this
context, the Court used as its guide to decision United States v. Liv-
ingston.16 Quoting from Livingston, the Court stated: "Though never
interpreted by a state court, if a state statute is not fairly subject to
an interpretation which will avoid or modify the federal constitutional
question, it is the duty of a federal court to decide the federal question
when presented to it." 17 Having found no "special circumstances" pres-
ent to support abstention, the Court went further in emphasizing that
9 People v. Zwickler (Sup. Ct., App. Term. Kings Co., April 23, 1965).
10 16 N.Y. 2d 1069, 266 N.Y.S.2d 140, 213 N.E.2d 467 (1965).
11261 F. Supp 985 (E.D. N.Y. 1966).
1228 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964).
1328 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964).
14380 U.S. 479 (1964).
15 389 U.S. 241, 245 (1967).
16 179 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. S.C. 1959), aff'd 364 U.S. 281 (1960).
"7389 U.S. 241, 251 (1967).
f[Vol. 52
RECENT DECISIONS
the Livingston doctrine is particularly viable when an action is main-
tained under the Civil Rights Act and a statute is attacked for over-
breadth and repugnancy to the First Amendment. The Court reiterated
the rationale of Dombrowski when it said that the "chilling effect" of
lengthy state court proceedings and ultimate review by the Supreme
Court may well constitute irreparable injury to the very right that the
plaintiff seeks to assert. In Dombrowski, the Court said:
We hold the abstention doctrine is inappropriate for cases such
as the present one where, unlike Douglas v. City of Jeannette,
statutes are justifiably attacked on their face as abridging free
expression, or are applied for the purpose of discouraging pro-
tected activities.1 s
It is interesting to speculate whether the Court would have
affirmed the decision of the district court had it found that section
781-b was susceptible to an interpretation by the state courts that would
have narrowed or presented the constitutional issue in a different
posture. It can be argued that the rule established in Harrison v.
NAACP 19 would then be applicable. The Court said in Harrison that:
All we hold is that these enactments should be exposed to a
state construction or limiting interpretation before the federal
courts are asked to decide upon their constitutionality, so that
federal judgment will be based on something that is a complete
product of the State, the enactment as phrased by its legislature
and as construed by its highest court.20
Conversely, it could be maintained that the very process of abstaining
under this "special circumstance" would inevitably "chill" and there-
fore irreparably injure the plaintiff's first amendment right of free
expression. The language of the Court in Dombrowski coupled with
the pointed affirmation of those same principles in Zwickler strongly
implies that the policy considerations of the latter argument would
supersede those of the former, so that abstention should not be applied.
Yet the Court states in its connective between the first and second issues
that ". . . unless appellant's addition of a prayer for injunctive relief
supplies one, no 'special circumstance' pre-requisite to application of
the abstention doctrine is present here. .... -21 This statement is subject
to a dual interpretation. It could mean that finding a "special circum-
stance," the Court would have ipso facto applied the abstention doc-
trine. More likely, it would seem to mean that the aforementioned
policy conflict would have become a real issue to be resolved by the
Court.
The second issue faced by the Court is whether or not a federal
18 380 U.S. 479, 489-90 (1964).
19 360 U.S. 167 (1958).
20 Id. at 178.
21 389 U.S. 241, 252 (1967).
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court may abstain from a request for declaratory relief if the plaintiff's
plea for injunctive relief is denied. The Court stated that the district
court misinterpreted the thrust of its opinion in Dombrowski when it
dealt with the request for declaratory and injunctive relief as a com-
posite issue. Instead, the Court said that "Dombrowski teaches that the
questions of abstention and of injunctive relief are not the same."22
Noting once again that the abstention doctrine would be inappropriate
in a case of this nature, the Court resolved this issue by stating:
[A] request for a declaratory judgment that a state statute is
overbroad on its face must be considered independently of any
request for injunctive relief against the enforcement of that
statute. We hold that a federal district court has the duty to
decide the appropriateness and the merits of the declaratory
request irrespective of its conclusion as to the propriety of the
issuance of the injunction. 23
Therefore, a district court confronted with a case like Zwickler must
first decide the merits of the request for declaratory relief uncontami-
nated by any conclusions it may have reached with regard to the issue
of injunctive relief. Only when the plea for declaratory relief prevails
is it necessary or proper for the court to consider the propriety of an
injunction.
In reaching a superficially palatable resolution of this issue, the
Supreme Court leaves unanswered two questions provoked by it in
the earlier part of the opinion. The Court never determines whether
the addition of the request for injunctive relief could have pro-
duced a "special circumstance" which would be appropriate to the doc-
trine of abstention. In Douglas v. City of Jeannette24 the Court said:
Congress, by its legislation, has adopted the policy, with cer-
tain well defined statutory exceptions, of leaving generally to the
state courts the trial of criminal cases arising under state laws,
subject to review by this court of any federal questions involved.
Hence, courts of equity in the exercise of their discretionary
powers should conform to this policy by refusing to interfere
with or embarrass threatened proceedings in §tate courts save
in those exceptional cases which call for the interposition of a
court of equity to prevent irreparable injury which is clear and
imminent; and equitable remedies infringing this independence
of the states-though they might otherwise be given-should be
withheld if sought on slight or inconsequential grounds.25
Thus, if a court comes to the same conclusions on the issue of injunc-
tive relief as the district court did in Zwickler, by applying Douglas,
it might come to the further conclusion that the issuance of an in-
22 Id. at 254.
23 Ibid.
24 319 U.S. 157 (1942).
23 d. at 163.
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junction would constitute unwarranted interference with the state's
criminal courts. This conclusion provides a "special circumstance"
appropriate to the conventional application of abstention to a request
for declaratory relief. Even if a court were faced by this possible con-
sequence, it could invoke the judicial doctrine of comity between the
state and federal courts, and thus deny an injunction but still grant
declaratory relief to the plaintiff.
Even more fundamental is the question of whether a court can
apply any "special circumstance" which might be produced by the
request for injunctive relief to the issue of abstention from the prayer
for a declaratory judgment. Since the Court says that the questions of
injunctive and declaratory relief are "independent," and that under the
circumstances present in Zwickler, a court's conclusions as to the
propriety of an injunction are "irrelevant" to the issue of abstention,
it can be inferred that the requests for injunctive and declaratory relief
are to be treated as completely exclusive of each other within the
prescribed order of decision.
In its opinion, the Supreme Court goes beyond a simple determina-
tion of the particular issues in Zwickler. As though they were pur-
posefully conceived, the Court implies certain propositions which will
be of particular significance when and if a court is confronted by a
request for both injunctive and declaratory relief in the context of
Zwickler and Dombrowski, and "special circumstances" are present
which would support the conventional application of abstention. It is
clear that, at the present time, the Court is not ready to transform
these implications into mandates. Therefore, the Court's opinion in
Zwickler will become additionally meaningful as those implications and
inferences are clarified, and established as rules, in subsequent inter-
pretations by the Supreme Court.
CHRIS M cNAUGHTON
Divorce: Cruel and Inhuman Treatment-Absence of Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The guiding consideration in mar-
riage dissolution cases is set forth in the first section of the Family Code:
It is the intent of chs. 245 to 248 to promote the stability and
best interests of marriage and the family. Marriage is the in-
stitution that is the foundation of the family and society. Its
stability is basic to morality and civilization, and of vital interest
to society and the state. The consequences of the marriage con-
tract are more significant to society than those of other contracts,
and the public interest must be taken into account always . .
The impairment or dissolution of the marriage relation generally
results in injury to the public wholly apart from the effect upon
the parties immediately concerned.'
Wis. STAT. § 245.001(2) (1967).
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